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Abstract
We consider the problem of private information retrieval (PIR) with colluding servers and
eavesdroppers (abbreviated as ETPIR). The ETPIR problem is comprised of K messages,
N servers where each server stores all K messages, a user who wants to retrieve one of the
K messages without revealing the desired message index to any set of T colluding servers,
and an eavesdropper who can listen to the queries and answers of any E servers but is pre-
vented from learning any information about the messages. The information theoretic capacity
of ETPIR is defined to be the maximum number of desired message symbols retrieved pri-
vately per information symbol downloaded. We show that the capacity of ETPIR is C =(
1− E
N
)(
1 + T−E
N−E
+ · · ·+
(
T−E
N−E
)K−1)−1
when E < T , and C =
(
1− E
N
)
when E ≥ T . To
achieve the capacity, the servers need to share a common random variable (independent of the
messages), and its size must be at least E
N
· 1
C
symbols per message symbol. Otherwise, with
less amount of shared common randomness, ETPIR is not feasible and the capacity reduces to
zero.
An interesting observation is that the ETPIR capacity expression takes different forms in
two regimes. When E < T , the capacity equals the inverse of a sum of a geometric series
with K terms and decreases with K; this form is typical for capacity expressions of PIR. When
E ≥ T , the capacity does not depend on K, a typical form for capacity expressions of SPIR
(symmetric PIR, which further requires data-privacy, i.e., the user learns no information about
other undesired messages); the capacity does not depend on T either. In addition, the ETPIR
capacity result includes multiple previous PIR and SPIR capacity results as special cases.
This paper was presented in part at Asilomar 2018.
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1 Introduction
The problem of private information retrieval (PIR) is to retrieve one message out of K messages
privately from N servers (each stores all K messages) without letting any server know the identity
of the requested message. An important factor in the design of such PIR protocols is the com-
munication efficiency. Recently, a series of works studies diverse variations of the PIR problem
from an information-theoretic perspective. Among these works, the messages are considered to be
long sequences, such that the upload cost is neglected as it is diminishing when compared to the
download cost. The communication efficiency is measured by the capacity, which is defined as the
maximum number of desired information bits retrieved privately per information bit downloaded.
The first work in this series is [1], which finds the PIR capacity as CPIR =
(
1 + 1
N
+ · · ·+
(
1
N
)K−1)−1
.
A significant number of following works add various elements to the PIR problem to form differ-
ent variations. Among these elements, three are most relevant to this work: colluding servers,
adversaries, and symmetric PIR (SPIR).
We first discuss related works on colluding servers. In the modeling of the initial work [1],
the servers do not share information about their communication with the user, i.e., they do not
collude to infer the identity of the requested message. However, it is possible in practical systems
that some sets of servers can communicate and then potentially collude. In [2], the problem
where any set of T servers may collude is studied (TPIR) and the capacity is established to be
CTPIR =
(
1 + T
N
+ · · ·+
(
T
N
)K−1)−1
. Beyond TPIR, PIR with arbitrary collusion patterns (where
the cardinality of each set of colluding servers may vary) is first studied in [3] and the capacity of
one particular case is found in [4], where the colluding sets are disjoint.
The second element is adversaries, referring to scenarios where the communication system is
vulnerable to passive and/or active attacks. This is also a practical factor to consider in PIR pro-
tocol design, because applications of cloud storage are usually built on open systems and networks,
where preserving data security and privacy is crucial and more challenging. The problem of TPIR
with an active adversary who may erase the responses from any A servers is considered in [2] and
interestingly, the capacity in this setting equals the capacity of TPIR with N − A servers (the
number of surviving servers). The problem of TPIR with a Byzantine (active) adversary who may
introduce arbitrary errors to the responses from any B servers is considered in [5] and interestingly,
the capacity in this setting equals the capacity of TPIR with N − 2B servers times (N − 2B)/N
(where 2B out of all N servers are used to identify and correct the errors and are thus wasted,
akin to the Hamming distance requirement in algebraic coding theory). In this work, we consider
the problem of TPIR with a passive eavesdropper who may hear the responses from any E servers
while learning nothing about the messages (ETPIR). The ETPIR problem is first studied in [6, 7],
where an achievable scheme and a converse are provided, although the two do not match. We will
close the gap and establish the exact capacity in this work. It turns out that neither the achievable
scheme nor the converse in [6, 7] is tight and we need to improve both. Recent work [8] considers
a related PIR setting with eavesdroppers, but the eavesdropping model is different. In [8], the
eavesdropper can wiretap all servers, but can only observe a fraction of each server’s answer. While
in our work, the eavesdropper can only wiretap E (instead of all N) servers, but if a server is
wiretapped, then its answer is fully (instead of partially) observed by the eavesdropper.
We finally consider SPIR. Relative to PIR, SPIR requires one more constraint on data-privacy
at the user side. Namely, the user should not learn any information about the other messages
besides the desired one. Although this work focuses exclusively on the PIR problem, our result
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ETPIR
When E < T When E ≥ T
C = 1−
E
N
TPIRC =
(
1 +
T
N
+ · · ·+
(
T
N
)K−1)−1
C =
(
1 +
1
N
+ · · ·+
(
1
N
)K−1)−1
C =
(
1−
E
N
)
·
(
1 +
T − E
N − E
+ · · ·+
(
T − E
N − E
)K−1)−1
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T
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1
N
T = 1
E = 0
“Add” S
E = 0
T = 1
Capacities depend on K Capacities do not depend on K
“Add” S
“Add” S
[2]
[1]
[7]
[10]
[9]
Figure 1: Connections to prior works and results.
turns out to relate intimately to SPIR so that a brief summary of known results along this line is
presented next. For a PIR problem, if the letter ‘S’ is added to its description, we are referring
to the same problem with SPIR constraint. For example, SPIR refers to the PIR problem with
data-privacy requirement, and its capacity is shown to be CSPIR = 1 −
1
N
[9]. The capacity of
TSPIR is characterized as CTSPIR = 1 −
T
N
, by specializing a more general result from [10]. The
capacity of TSPIR with Byzantine (active) adversaries is characterized as CBTSPIR = 1 −
2B+T
N
in [11, 7]. The capacity of ETSPIR is established to be CETSPIR = 1 −
max(T,E)
N
in [11, 7]. An
interesting observation from these results is that the capacity of a PIR problem is always the inverse
of a sum of a geometric series with K terms, and decreases with the number of messages K while
the capacity of an SPIR problem does not depend K. Furthermore, the SPIR capacity is the limit
of the corresponding PIR capacity by taking K →∞.
The main contribution of this work is that we characterize the capacity of ETPIR (where
two elements – eavesdropper and colluding servers are added to the conventional setting of PIR).
Specifically, K messages are replicated at N servers. A user wants to retrieve one message by
communicating with the servers, without revealing the identity of the desired message. Any T
servers may collude, that is, they may share their communication with the user to infer the desired
message index. The system is vulnerable to eavesdroppers, who are curious about the messages
and can tap in on the communication between any E servers and the user. The ETPIR protocol
should prevent the eavesdropper from learning any information about the messages. We show that
the capacity of ETPIR is
CETPIR =


(
1− E
N
)
·
(
1 + T−E
N−E +
(
T−E
N−E
)2
+ · · ·+
(
T−E
N−E
)K−1)−1
, when E < T ;
1− E
N
, when E ≥ T.
(1)
To achieve the capacity, the servers need to share some common randomness that is independent
3
of the messages, in the amount of at least an E
N
fraction of one over the capacity times the message
size. Otherwise, the capacity is zero and the ETPIR problem is not feasible.
The ETPIR capacity result includes the capacity results of various previously studied settings
as special cases, e.g., TPIR, PIR, ETSPIR, TSPIR and SPIR. A pictorial illustration is shown in
Figure 1. It is interesting that in the regime of E ≥ T , ETPIR capacity is always equal to ETSPIR
capacity (instead of approaching it in the large K limit), i.e., there is no penalty in the retrieval
rate by further requiring data-privacy at the user side.
1.1 Notations
Let [m : n] denote the set {m,m + 1, . . . , n} for m ≤ n, and let (m : n) denote the vector
(m,m+1, . . . , n). To simplify the notation, denote the set of random variables {Xm,Xm+1, . . . ,Xn}
by X[m:n] and the vector (Xm,Xm+1, . . . ,Xn) by X(m:n). For an index set I = {i1, i2, . . . , in},
denote the set of variables {Xi : i ∈ I} by XI . The cardinality of a set A is denoted by |A|.
We denote the dimension of a matrix by the superscript (the dimension is omitted when there
is no ambiguity). For example, a matrix M with m rows and n columns is denoted by Mm×n.
When the matrix is square (m = n), the notation is simplified to Mm. The identity matrix with
dimension m ×m is denoted by Im. The set of all full-rank n × n matrices over a finite field Fq
is denoted by GLn(Fq). For a matrix M, M[I, :] denotes the submatrix of M formed by the rows
corresponding to the elements of the vector I. If G is comprised of A × B square matrices with
dimension I × I, i.e., G is a block matrix with dimensions AI ×BI,
G =

M1,1 · · · M1,B... . . . ...
MA,1 · · · MA,B

 , (2)
where Mi,j are all I × I matrices, denote the i-th block row by G
I [i, :] (i.e., the submatrix of G
comprised of I rows from the [(i− 1)I + 1]-th row to the iI-th row),
GI [i, :] =
[
Mi,1 · · · Mi,B
]
. (3)
Block column is defined in a similar way. The notation ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product. We
denote the m × n Vandermonde matrix generated from n distinct symbols λ1, λ2, . . . , λn from a
finite field by Vm(λ1, . . . , λn), i.e.,
Vm(λ1, . . . , λn) =


1 1 · · · 1
λ1 λ2 · · · λn
...
...
. . .
...
λm−11 λ
m−1
2 · · · λ
m−1
n

 . (4)
2 Problem Setup
A database comprised ofK messages is replicated atN servers. The messages {Wk} are independent
and each message consists of L symbols from Fq.
H(Wk) = L, for k = 1, . . . ,K ; H(W1, . . . ,WK) = KL. (5)
Here and throughout the paper we measure entropy to base q.
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A user wants to retrieve a messageWκ with index κ from the servers, where the desired message
index κ follows some prior distribution over [1 : K]. Denote the realization of κ by k. Based on k,
the user generates random queries to send to the servers. The query received by Server n is denoted
by Q
[k]
n . Let Q =
[
Q
[k]
n
]
n∈[1:N ],k∈[1:K]
denote the complete query scheme, namely, the collection
of all queries under all choices of the desired message index. The queries are independent of the
messages, i.e.,
I(Q;W[1:K]) = 0. (6)
In the communication system, an eavesdropper is interested in the messages and can tap in on
the communication between any E servers and the user. To prevent the eavesdropper from learning
the messages, the servers share a common random variable, denoted by S, which is independent of
the messages and the queries, i.e.,
I(S;W[1:K],Q) = 0. (7)
Let ρ denote the ratio of the amount of common randomness relative to the message size, i.e.,
ρ ,
H(S)
H(Wk)
=
H(S)
L
. (8)
The servers follow the protocol agreed with the user a priori, and generate answers based on the
received query Q
[k]
n , the stored messages W[1:K], and the common random variable S. The answer
sent to the user from Server n is denoted by A
[k]
n . We have
H(A[k]n |Q
[k]
n ,W[1:K], S) = 0. (9)
The eavesdropper must learn no information about the messages from the queries and answers
of any E servers. That is, the following E-security constraint must be satisfied,
[E-security] I(W[1:K];A
[k]
E , Q
[k]
E ) = 0,∀E ⊂ [1 : N ], |E| = E. (10)
Any T servers may collude. To guarantee user-privacy, from the queries and answers of any T
servers, together with the message contents and the common random variable, the servers should
not be able to infer any information about the desired message index. Thus, the following T -privacy
constraint must be satisfied,
[T -privacy] I(A
[κ]
T , Q
[κ]
T ,W[1:K], S;κ) = 0,∀T ⊂ [1 : N ], |T | = T. (11)
From all the answers downloaded from the servers and the available information at the user,
the user should be able to decode the desired message with diminishing probability of error as L
tends to infinity. By Fano’s inequality, this corresponds to the following correctness constraint,
[Correctness] H(Wk|A
[k]
[1:N ], Q
[k]
[1:N ]) = o(L). (12)
The ETPIR rate, R of a scheme characterizes the number of desired information symbols re-
trieved per downloaded information symbol,
R =
H(Wk)∑N
n=1H(A
[k]
n )
=
L∑N
n=1H(A
[k]
n )
. (13)
A rate R is said to be ǫ-error achievable if there exists a sequence of ETPIR schemes with rate at
least R, and probability of error Pe → 0 as L →∞. The supremum of all ǫ-error achievable rates
is called the ǫ-error capacity C.
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3 Main Result
Theorem 1 below states the main result of this work.
Theorem 1 The capacity of the ETPIR problem is
CETPIR =


(
1− E
N
)
·
(
1 + T−E
N−E +
(
T−E
N−E
)2
+ · · ·+
(
T−E
N−E
)K−1)−1
, when E < T ;
1− E
N
, when E ≥ T.
(14)
To achieve the capacity, ρETPIR ≥
E
N
·C−1
ETPIR
. If ρETPIR <
E
N
·C−1
ETPIR
, the ETPIR problem is not
feasible.
For our theorem, we have the following interesting observations.
Observation 1 When E = 0, CETPIR = CTPIR =
(
1 + T
N
+ · · ·+ ( T
N
)K−1
)−1
. Therefore, Theo-
rem 1 includes the capacity of TPIR [2] as a special case.
Observation 2 When T = 1, CETPIR = CEPIR = 1−
E
N
. Note that the EPIR problem (PIR with
eavesdroppers) has not been studied in the literature. Therefore, the capacity of EPIR is obtained
from Theorem 1 as a rewarding by-product.
Observation 3 When E = 0, T = 1, CETPIR = CPIR =
(
1 + 1
N
+ · · ·+ ( 1
N
)K−1
)−1
. Therefore,
Theorem 1 includes the capacity of PIR [1] as a special case.
Observation 4 When T ≤ N − E, our achievable scheme attains the capacity with zero-error.
When T > N − E, our achievable scheme has ǫ-error. It is interesting to see if the scheme can be
strengthened to have zero-error.
Observation 5 When E < T , the capacity is the product of two terms. The first term 1−E
N
= N−E
N
has an intuitive illustration – from the security constraint (10), the answers from any E servers
provide no useful information to decode the messages (out of the N servers, only N −E are useful.
Thus we have the ratio N−E
N
). The second term
(
1 + T−E
N−E +
(
T−E
N−E
)2
+ · · · +
(
T−E
N−E
)K−1)−1
is
more intriguing. Note that it is equal to the capacity of TPIR with N −E servers where any T −E
servers might collude. If we view the first E servers as noise (common randomness) providers, then
we are left with N − E servers that return noiseless answers. For the remaining N − E servers,
a first thought is that any T (instead of T − E) servers might collude. Interestingly, it turns out
that the first E noise providing servers also contribute to reduce the T -privacy constraint in the
original N servers setting to the (T −E)-privacy constraint in the N−E servers setting after noise
is cancelled.
Observation 6 When E ≥ T , the second term disappears (the T -privacy constraint is dominated
by the E-security constraint) and the capacity depends neither on K nor on T . As the capacity does
not depend on T , there is no penalty in increasing T to E, i.e., we automatically have E-privacy
(see the achievable scheme in Section 5).
Observation 7 When E ≥ T , the capacity of ETPIR turns out to be equal to the capacity of
ETSPIR [11]. As ETSPIR requires one more data-privacy constraint at the user, it is evident
that the converse of ETPIR also holds for ETSPIR. Our achievable scheme for ETPIR directly
guarantees data-privacy such that data-privacy is obtained for free.
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Observation 8 When E < T , limK→∞CETPIR = CETSPIR (consistent with previous relations
between PIR capacity and SPIR capacity); when E ≥ T , CETPIR ≡ CETSPIR (distinct from previous
relations).
4 Achievability when E < T
In this section, we present the proof of the achievability part of Theorem 1 for the case of E < T . In
the setting of TPIR [2], the queries are constructed using an MDS code. However, for our setting of
ETPIR (with an additional element of eavesdroppers), MDS coded queries no longer suffice and we
need a more sophisticated design. A high level description of the protocol design is as follows. As
the eavesdropper can tap in on any E answers (meaning that the combination of any E answers can
not contain any useful information about the messages), the shared common randomness is coded
with an (N,E)-MDS matrix and added to the answers as the noise to guarantee E-security and the
property that the noise can be cancelled by projecting the answers to the dual space of the (N,E)-
MDS code. After the noise is cancelled, we wish to ensure that the undesired symbols retain certain
linear dependency (for example, MDS property suffices) such that they (named interference) can be
cancelled and the desired symbols can be decoded. Beyond this correctness constraint, we further
need to satisfy T -privacy by ensuring that every T servers observe linearly independent queries.
For such a purpose, an (N,T )-MDS structure on the queries is desired. To summarize, the essence
of our scheme is that the queries are coded by a (first) MDS code, and after projecting queries to
the dual space of the (second) MDS code of the common randomness, the projected queries still
form a (third) MDS code. Next we illustrate this design progressively by a series of examples with
increasing complexity in Sections 4.1 - 4.5, leading to the general scheme in Section 4.6.
4.1 Elemental case K = 2, N = 3, T = 2, E = 1
Let’s start with the smallest setting with K = 2 messages, N = 3 servers where any T = 2 may
collude, and an eavesdropper who may hear the communication associated with any E = 1 server.
Let {ai} and {bi} denote the mixtures (linear combinations) of symbols fromW1 andW2 respec-
tively, and let r, s, t denote three uniform independent symbols shared by the servers (unknown to
the eavesdropper and the user). It is natural to start with a scheme in the following form where the
answer from 1 server is pure noise. Without loss of generality, suppose the user wants to retrieve
W1.
Server 1 Server 2 Server 3
a1 + r a3 + r r
b1 + s b2 + s s
a2 + b2 + t a4 + b1 + t t
Although the above scheme is correct as noise variables and non-desired symbols can be can-
celled, it is not 2-private as Server 1 and Server 2 can collude and figure out that the b symbols have
the same indices while the a symbols have distinct indices. To make it 2-private, we add message
symbols with carefully chosen linear coefficients to Server 3 (so that it will enhance privacy and
simultaneously act as the noise provider), as shown below.
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Server 1 Server 2 Server 3
a1 + r a3 + r a5 + r
b1 + s b3 + s b5 + s
a2 + b2 + t a4 + b4 + t a6 + b6 + t
The specific construction of the mixtures {ai} and {bi} is as follows. Assume each message
consists of 4 symbols from a field Fq with q ≥ 3. Let W1 and W2 denote the column vectors
comprised of the L = 4 symbols of each message. The user privately chooses two 4× 4 matrices U1
and U2 independently and uniformly from GL4(Fq). Recall that a(1:4) and b(1:4) denote the column
vectors comprised of {a1, . . . , a4} and {b1, . . . , b4}, respectively. They are generated by
a(1:4) = U1W1, (15)
b(1:4) = U2W2. (16)
Further, a5, a6, b5, b6 are assigned as follows.
Server 1 Server 2 Server 3
a1 + r a3 + r a1 + a3 + r
b1 + s b3 + s b3 + (b4 − b2) + s
a2 + b2 + t a4 + b4 + t (a2 + a4) + (b3 − b1) + (2b4 − b2) + t
The query sent to Server 1 is (U1[1, :],U2[1, :],U1[2, :],U2[2, ; ]), i.e., the coefficients for the message
symbols. Using the coefficients received, the servers then produce the answers according to the table
above.
Next, we remove the noise variables by subtracting the answers of Server 1 from the answers of
Server 2 and Server 3.
Server 2 − Server 1 Server 3 − Server 1
(a3 − a1) a3
(b3 − b1) (b3 − b1) + (b4 − b2)
(a4 − a2) + (b4 − b2) a4 + (b3 − b1) + 2(b4 − b2)
We are now ready to prove that the scheme satisfies the required properties.
Correctness: We call one row of the retrieval table a query row. That is, a query row is comprised
of one symbol (in the same row) downloaded from each server. After removing the noise symbols
r, s, t, from the first query row (i.e., a1 + r, a3 + r, a1 + a3 + r), the user decodes a1 and a3. From
the second query row, the user obtains b3− b1 and b4− b2, which are used to cancel the interference
caused by W2 in the third query row. After canceling the interference, the user decodes a2 and a4
from the third query row. Because U1 is full-rank and known by the user, the user can decode the
4 symbols of W1 from a(1:4).
1-security: Because r, s, t are uniformly distributed random variables independent of the message
symbols, we have I(W1,W2;A
[k]
n , Q
[k]
n ) = I(W1,W2;A
[k]
n |Q
[k]
n ) = H(A
[k]
n |Q
[k]
n )−H(A
[k]
n |W1,W2, Q
[k]
n ) =
H(A
[k]
n |Q
[k]
n )−H(r, s, t) = 0. Therefore, from the answer of any server, the eavesdropper can learn
nothing about the messages W1,W2.
2-privacy: Privacy is guaranteed by the observation that the answers of any 2 servers contain 4
linearly independent random combinations of symbols from each message. For example, Server 1
and Server 2 observe a(1:4) and b(1:4), which are linearly independent random combinations of the
2 messages. Server 1 and Server 3 observe[
a1, a2, b1, b2
a1 + a3, a2 + a4,−b2 + b3 + b4,−b1 − b2 + b3 + 2b4
]
invertible
⇐====⇒
[
a1, a2, b1, b2
a3, a4, b3, b4
]
(17)
8
Therefore, Server 1 and Server 3 also observe linearly independent random combinations of W1 and
W2. The case where Server 2 and Server 3 collude follows similarly.
Because U1 and U2 are independently and uniformly chosen from all 4× 4 full-rank matrices,
the mapping from W1 to a(1:4) is i.i.d. as the mapping from W2 to b(1:4). The invertible relation
in (17) indicates that the random variables on both sides of (17) are identically distributed (a more
detailed proof of this argument appears in Lemma 1 of [2]), so that any 2 servers cannot distinguish
W1 and W2 and the scheme is private.
Achievable rate: The scheme downloads 9 symbols in total, out of which the user can decode 4
desired symbols. Therefore, the rate achieved by this scheme is 4/9, which matches the capacity
promised in Theorem 1. The achieved common randomness size ρ (1/3 of the total download) is
also as promised.
In this section, we present a capacity achieving scheme for the smallest non-trivial setting.
When we proceed to larger parameters, the main challenge is to design the linear combination
coefficients of the desired and undesired symbols (named precoding or the precoding matrices), such
that
1. Any T servers observe linearly independent combinations of symbols from each message (to
guarantee T -privacy);
2. After the noise is cancelled, the interference of undesired symbols can be canceled as well;
3. After the noise and the interference of undesired symbols are cancelled, the desired symbols
have full rank (to guarantee that the desired message can be recovered).
4.2 More layers when the number of messages K increases, K = 3, N = 3, T =
2, E = 1
We consider an example where the number of messages increases. In this case, the scheme has more
layers and interestingly, the layers can be designed independently.
Suppose each message consists of 8 symbols from a finite field Fq with q ≥ 3. The user privately
chooses 3 matrices U1,U2,U3 uniformly and independently from GL8(Fq). Let a(1:8) = U1W1,
b(1:8) = U2W2, and c(1:8) = U3W3, and let s(1:7) contain the noise variables. The retrieval scheme
for W1 is shown below, which includes 3 layers separated by dashed lines.
Server 1 Server 2 Server 3
a1 + s1 a5 + s1 a1 + a5 + s1
b1 + s2 b5 + s2 b5 + (b6 − b2) + s2
c1 + s3 c5 + s3 c5 + (c6 − c2) + s3
a2 + b2 + s4 a6 + b6 + s4 a2 + a6 + (b5 − b1) + (2b6 − b2) + s4
a3 + c2 + s5 a7 + c6 + s5 a3 + a7 + (c5 − c1) + (2c6 − c2) + s5
b3 + c3 + s6 b7 + c7 + s6 b7 + c7 + (b8 + c8 − b4 − c4) + s6
a4 + b4 + c4 + s7 a8 + b8 + c8 + s7 a4 + a8 + (b7 + c7 − b3 − c3) + (2b8 + 2c8 − b4 − c4) + s7
Note that the scheme uses the same precoding in Section 4.1 3 times, i.e., for the b symbols
in layer 1 and layer 2, the c symbols in layer 1 and layer 2, and the b + c symbols in layer 2 and
layer 3. The design cross different layers may not be the same in general (for more details, refer to
Section 4.6).
Security is obvious. Correctness and privacy can be checked similar to the proof in Section 4.1.
The rate achieved is 8/21, matching the capacity in Theorem 1.
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4.3 Precoding design when the number of servers N increases, K = 2, N = 4, T =
2, E = 1
Assume each message consists of 9 symbols from a field Fq with q ≥ 9 and the user wants to retrieve
W1. In the following retrieval table, the 4 symbols r, s, t, z are independent and uniform random
symbols privately shared by the servers.
Server 1 Server 2 Server 3 Server 4
a1 + r a4 + r a7 + r a10 + r
b1 + s b4 + s b7 + s b10 + s
a2 + b2 + t a5 + b5 + t a8 + b8 + t a11 + b11 + t
a3 + b3 + z a6 + b6 + z a9 + b9 + z a12 + b12 + z
The user privately chooses 2 9×9 matrices U1 and U2 from GL9(Fq). Let G1 = V
4(φ1, φ2, φ3),
i.e., a Vandermonde matrix with distinct nonzero φi’s, and φi 6= 1, i ∈ [1 : 3],
G1 =


1 1 1
φ1 φ2 φ3
φ21 φ
2
2 φ
2
3
φ31 φ
3
2 φ
3
3

 . (18)
Let G2 denote a 12× 9 matrix,
G2 =


I3 0
0 I3
I3 −M1 M1
I3 −M2 M2

 , (19)
where I3 is the 3× 3 identity matrix, and M1 and M2 are 3× 3 matrices specified as follows. For 3
distinct nonzero elements ψ1, ψ2, ψ3 that are not the 6-th roots of unity in Fq, i.e., ψ
6
i 6= 1, i ∈ [1 : 3],
we set
M1 = V
3(ψ1, ψ2, ψ3) · diag(ψ
3
1 , ψ
3
2 , ψ
3
3) · [V
3(ψ1, ψ2, ψ3)]
−1, (20)
M2 = V
3(ψ1, ψ2, ψ3) · diag(ψ
6
1 , ψ
6
2 , ψ
6
3) · [V
3(ψ1, ψ2, ψ3)]
−1. (21)
a(1:12) are designed as follows, where each query row is precoded by G1.
[a1, a4, a7, a10]
T = G1U1[(1 : 3), :]W1, (22)
[a2, a5, a8, a11]
T = G1U1[(4 : 6), :]W1, (23)
[a3, a6, a9, a11]
T = G1U1[(7 : 9), :]W1, (24)
b(1:12) are precoded by G2,
b(1:12) = G2U2[(1 : 6), :]W2. (25)
The description of the scheme is complete and we prove that the scheme is correct, private,
secure and capacity achieving.
Correctness: We first cancel the noise.
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Server 2 − Server 1 Server 3 − Server 1 Server 4 − Server 1
a4 − a1 a7 − a1 a10 − a1
b4 − b1 b7 − b1 b10 − b1
(a5 − a2) + (b5 − b2) (a8 − a2) + (b8 − b2) (a11 − a2) + (b11 − b2)
(a6 − a3) + (b6 − b3) (a9 − a3) + (b9 − b3) (a12 − a3) + (b12 − b3)
From the precoding of b(1:12) (25) and the structure of G2 (19), for the undesired symbols we have

b7 − b1
b8 − b2
b9 − b3
b10 − b1
b11 − b2
b12 − b3

 =
[
M1
M2
]
·

b4 − b1b5 − b2
b6 − b3

 . (26)
From the definition of M1 (20) and M2 (21), we know that [I
3;M1;M2] = V
9(ψ1, ψ2, ψ3) ·
[V3(ψ1, ψ2, ψ3)]
−1 is the systematic form of a Vandermonde matrix, and thus is a 9 × 3 MDS
matrix. Therefore, the 3 exposed symbols b4 − b1, b7 − b1, b10 − b1 in the second query row are
sufficient to reconstruct the remaining 6 symbols b5 − b2, b6 − b3, b8 − b2, b9 − b3, b11 − b2, b12 − b3
in the third and fourth query rows. Hence, the interference caused by b(1:12) can be cancelled and
the user obtains
Server 2 − Server 1 Server 3 − Server 1 Server 4 − Server 1
a4 − a1 a7 − a1 a10 − a1
a5 − a2 a8 − a2 a11 − a2
a6 − a3 a9 − a3 a12 − a3
From the definition ofG1 (18), and the assumption that the φi’s are nonzero, distinct, and φi 6= 1, it
is easy to check that each query row above contains 3 linear independent combinations of the desired
symbols. Further, U1 has full rank and the user can invert the 9 linear independent combinations
of the desired symbols to decode W1.
2-privacy: From the precoding of the desired symbols (22)-(24), the linear combinations of W1
across query rows are independent. In addition, from the structure of G1 (18), within each query
row, every 3 ai symbols are linearly independent. Therefore, every 2 servers observe 6 linear
independent combinations of W1.
We next show that every 2 servers observe linear independent combinations of W2. From (25),
G2 expands 6 linear independent combinations of W2 to 12 symbols, which are distributed to the
servers. The precoding coefficients of the 6 bi symbols observed by any 2 servers are given by the
following 6 matrices (each of which is a submatrix of G2),[
I3 0
0 I3
]
,
[
I3 0
I3 −M1 M1
]
,
[
I3 0
I3 −M2 M2
]
,
[
0 I3
I3 −M1 M1
]
,
[
0 I3
I3 −M2 M2
]
,
[
I3 −M1 M1
I3 −M2 M2
]
.(27)
We are left to prove that these 6 matrices are invertible, which is is equivalent to prove that
M1, M2, I
3 −M1, I
3 −M2 and M1 −M2 are invertible. This follows from (20), (21) and the
assumption that ψi 6= 0, ψ
6
i 6= 1.
Therefore, any 2 servers observe linear independent random combinations ofW1 andW2 so that
the mappings to W1 and W2 are i.i.d. and 2-privacy is guaranteed.
Security is easy to verify. The rate achieved is equal to the capacity, 9/16 and the size of
common randomness used is 1/4 of the total download, as desired.
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4.4 Precoding of noise symbols when E > 1, K = 2, N = 5, T = 3, E = 2
In the 3 examples above, E = 1 and all servers use the same noise (common randomness) symbols
to add on the message symbols (i.e., repetition code is used). When E > 1, the noise symbols
are precoded by an (N,E)-MDS code. To illustrate how this is done, we present an example with
E = 2.
Assume each message is comprised of 9 symbols from a sufficiently large field Fq, and the user
wants W1. In the scheme described below, the user downloads 20 symbols in total, achieving the
capacity of 9/20.
Server 1 Server 2 Server 3 Server 4 Server 5
a1 + r1 a4 + r2 a7 + r1 + r2 a10 + r1 + 2r2 a13 + 2r1 + 3r2
b1 + s1 b4 + s2 b7 + s1 + s2 b10 + s1 + 2s2 b13 + 2s1 + 3s2
a2 + b2 + t1 a5 + b5 + t2 a8 + b8 + t1 + t2 a11 + b11 + t1 + 2t2 a14 + b14 + 2t1 + 3t2
a3 + b3 + z1 a6 + b6 + z2 a9 + b9 + z1 + z2 a12 + b12 + z1 + 2z2 a15 + b15 + 2z1 + 3z2
In the retrieval table above, the 8 shared symbols r1, r2, s1, s2, t1, t2, z1, z2 are uniform and
independent random variables. The precoding matrix and parity check matrix of the noise symbols
are
CS =


1 0
0 1
1 1
1 2
2 3

 , HS =

−1 −1 1 0 0−1 −2 0 1 0
−2 −3 0 0 1

 . (28)
where the same precoding matrix is applied to the noise symbols in each query row. For example,
in the first query row, r1, r2 is precoded by CS to produce r1, r2, r1+ r2, r1+2r2, 2r1+3r2 (one for
each server). 2-security follows by noting that CS is an MDS matrix where any 2 rows are linearly
independent.
In what follows, we present the precoding design of a(1:15) and b(1:15). The user privately chooses
2 matrices U1 and U2 uniformly and independently from GL9(Fq). The precoding of the desired
message symbols occurs in each query row, by the same 5× 3 matrix G1,
G1 =


1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
1 3 2
2 3 1

 . (29)
The precoding of the undesired message symbols is over all 15 bi symbols, the coefficients of which
are described by a 15× 9 matrix G2. Thus, a(1:15) and b(1:15) are generated by
[a1, a4, a7, a10, a13]
T = G1U1[(1 : 3), :]W1, (30)
[a2, a5, a8, a11, a14]
T = G1U1[(4 : 6), :]W1, (31)
[a3, a6, a9, a12, a15]
T = G1U1[(7 : 9), :]W1, (32)
b(1:15) = G2U2W2. (33)
The matrix G2 will be specified later.
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Upon receiving the answers, the user first cancels the noise by multiplying HS with the answers
in each query row.
Server 3 − Server 1 − Server 2 Server 4 − Server 1 − 2Server 2 Server 5 − 2Server 1− 3Server 2
a7 − a1 − a4 a10 − a1 − 2a4 a13 − 2a1 − 3a4
b7 − b1 − b4 b10 − b1 − 2b4 b13 − 2b1 − 3b4
a8 − a2 − a5 + b8 − b2 − b5 a11 − a2 − 2a5 + b11 − b2 − 2b5 a14 − 2a2 − 3a5 + b14 − 2b2 − 3b5
a9 − a3 − a6 + b9 − b3 − b6 a12 − a3 − 2a6 + b12 − b3 − 2b6 a15 − 2a3 − 3a6 + b15 − 2b3 − 3b6
where after the noise symbols are cancelled, the 9 × 9 precoding matrices associated with U1W1
and U2W2 respectively are
1
F1 = (HS ·G1)⊗ I
3, (34)
F2 = (HS ⊗ I
3) ·G2. (35)
To successfully decode the 9 symbols of W1, the bi symbols in the third and fourth query rows
should be cancelled by the symbols in the second query row; the 9 ai symbols should be linearly
independent. Therefore, the correctness criterion on F1 and F2 is
Correctness condition 1 (for desired symbols): F1 is non-singular.
Correctness condition 2 (for undesired symbols): there exists a systematic MDS
matrix Minterference =

 I3M1
M2

 where M1 and M2 are 2 3× 3 matrices, such that
F2 = Minterference · F2[(1 : 3), :]. (36)
Note that this condition is sufficient but not necessary to cancel the interference.
From (36), G2 can be represented in terms of M1 and M2,
G2 =

 I9I3 −M1, 2I3 −M1,M1
2I3 −M2, 3I
3 −M2,M2

 ·G2[(1 : 9), :], (37)
where we set G2[(1 : 9), :] = I
9.
To guarantee 3-privacy, we require every 3 servers observe independent random linear combi-
nations of both messages, which is translated into the following two conditions.
Privacy condition 1 (for desired symbols): 10 submatrices of G1, each of which
is comprised of 3 distinct rows, are non-singular.
Privacy condition 2 (for undesired symbols): 10 submatrices of G2, each of which
is comprised of 9 rows that specify the precoding coefficients of the bi symbols observed
by 3 distinct servers, are non-singular.
1From (30)-(33), F1 is associated with U1W1 in an order specified by the query rows (e.g., the coefficients of the
first two queries a7 − a1 − a4 and a10 − a1 − 2a4 in the first query row are specified by the first two rows of F1,
respectively); F2 is associated with U2W2 in lexicographic order (e.g., the coefficients of the two queries with smallest
symbol indices in b, b7 − b1 − b4 and b8 − b2 − b5 are specified by the first two rows of F2, respectively). Note that
these orders are not essential in the later proof.
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It is easy to verify that the 10 submatrices of G1 (refer to (29)) are invertible, and privacy
condition 1 is satisfied. Further,
HS ·G1 =

−1 −1 10 1 2
1 0 1

 , (38)
which is invertible. Hence, F1 = (HS ·G1)⊗I
3 is invertible, and correctness condition 1 is satisfied.
Instead of finding an explicit choice of G2 as in previous sections (which is complicated in
general because G2 contains certain non-trivial structure, e.g., see (37)), we show the existence of
such G2 over a large field via the Schwartz Zippel lemma [12, 13]. In fact, by choosing the entries
of M1,M2 uniformly and independently from a sufficiently large field, the conditions are satisfied
with high probability so that almost all choices will work.
Note that G2 is determined by M1 and M2 and we will choose the 18 entries in M1 and
M2 independently and uniformly over a sufficiently large field. Correctness condition 2 requires
Minterference = [I
3;M1;M2] to be MDS, meaning that its
(9
3
)
submatrices (each of which contains
3 distinct rows from Minterference) are invertible. It is easy to see that the determinant polynomial
for each of them is not the zero-polynomial, then they are invertible with high probability by the
Schwartz Zippel lemma [12, 13]. Privacy condition 2 requires 10 specific submatrices of G2 to be
invertible. Similarly, we need to show that their determinant polynomials are non-zero, for which
we defer the detailed proof to Section 4.6 for the general case to avoid repetition.
Therefore, we have proved the existence of certain G1,G2 that produces a private and correct
scheme.
4.5 Servers observe linearly dependent symbols when T > N − E, K = 2, N =
4, T = 3, E = 2
We consider the smallest case where T > N − E. In this regime, it turns out that the servers
observe linearly dependent symbols. This phenomenon has not been observed in the literature
and existing privacy proofs will fail. We tackle this challenge by increasing the message size (i.e.,
append dummy variables that are globally known) so that the symbols (after lengthening) become
linearly independent again.
Assume each message consists of 4 symbols from a field Fq, and the user wants W1. The scheme
is described below.
Server 1 Server 2 Server 3 Server 4
a1 + r1 a3 + r2 a5 + r1 + r2 a7 + r1 + 2r2
b1 + s1 b3 + s2 b5 + s1 + s2 b7 + s1 + 2s2
a2 + b2 + t1 a4 + b4 + t2 a6 + b6 + t1 + t2 a8 + b8 + t1 + 2t2
where the precoding matrix of the noise symbols r1, r2, s1, s2, t1, t2 and the parity check matrix are
CS =


1 0
0 1
1 1
1 2

 , HS =
[
−1 −1 1 0
−1 −2 0 1
]
. (39)
Note that every 3 servers observe 6 (mixed) symbols from each message and each message has
4 symbols, so the colluding servers do observe linear dependency in the symbols. To deal with this,
14
we add 2 dummy variables (known to the user) to each message. Denote the extended messages by
W˜1 and W˜2, each of length 6.
The user privately chooses 2 matrices U1 and U2 uniformly and independently from GL6(Fq),
a(1:8) and b(1:8) are generated by
a(1:8) = G1U1W˜1, (40)
b(1:8) = G2U2W˜2, (41)
where G1 is an 8 × 6 matrix where each entry is chosen independently and uniformly from a
sufficiently large field, and
G8×62 =
[
I6
I2 −M, 2I2 −M,M
]
, (42)
M =
[
1 1
ψ1 ψ2
]
· diag(ψ21 , ψ
2
2) ·
[
1 1
ψ1 ψ2
]−1
, ψ1 6= ψ2, ψ
2
i − 1 6= 0, ψ
2
i − 2 6= 0. (43)
3-privacy: Note that the 4 submatrices of G1 corresponding to 4 possible 3-colluding servers
have non-zero determinant polynomials, then by the Schwartz Zippel lemma, the probability that
G1 works approaches 1 as q increases. With any such realization of G1, every 3 servers observe
linearly independent combinations of W˜1. We may similarly check that every 3 servers observe
linearly independent combinations of W˜2. Hence, 3-privacy is guaranteed.
Correctness: After the noise symbols are cancelled, we have
Server 3 − Server 1 − Server 2 Server 4 − Server 1 − 2Server 2
a5 − a1 − a3 a7 − a1 − 2a3
b5 − b1 − b3 b7 − b1 − 2b3
a6 − a2 − a4 + b6 − b2 − b4 a8 − a2 − 2a4 + b8 − b2 − 2b4
where the coefficients of the b symbols are
F2 = (HS ⊗ I
2) ·G2 =
[
−I −I I
−M −M M
]
=
[
I
M
]
· F2[(1 : 2), :], (44)
where [I;M] is MDS from (43). Then b6 − b2 − b4 and b8 − b2 − 2b4 can be constructed from
b5 − b1 − b3 and b7 − b1 − 2b3. The coefficients of the 4 desired symbols of W1 are
F1 ·U1[:, (1 : 4)] = (HS ⊗ I
2) ·G1 ·U1[:, (1 : 4)]. (45)
To correctly decode the desired symbols, F1 · U1[:, (1 : 4)] must be non-singular. Consider an
arbitrary realization of U1. Note that U1[:, (1 : 4)] has full-column rank, i.e., there exists 4 rows of
U1[:, (1 : 4)] that are linearly independent (assume to be the first 4 rows without loss of generality).
Then, we can set the last 2 columns of G1 to be zeros, and G1[:, (1 : 4)] to G1 ⊗ I
2, where
G1 =


1 0
0 1
2 2
2 4

. As a result, (HS ⊗ I2) ·G1[:, (1 : 4)] = (HS ·G1) ⊗ I2, where HS ·G1 =
[
1 1
1 2
]
is invertible. Therefore, (HS ⊗ I
2) · G1[:, (1 : 4)] and F1 · U1[:, (1 : 4)] are invertible, and the
determinant polynomial of F1 ·U1[:, (1 : 4)] is not the zero polynomial. By the Schwartz Zippel
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Server n
Layer 1:
{
X
[1]
i + S
[1]
i
}
i∈I(n,1,1)
...{
X
[K]
i + S
[K]
i
}
i∈I(n,1,K)
Layer 2:
{
X
[1]
i +X
[2]
i + S
[1,2]
i
}
i∈I(n,2,1){
X
[1]
i +X
[3]
i + S
[1,3]
i
}
i∈I(n,2,2)
...{
X
[1]
i +X
[K]
i + S
[1,K]
i
}
i∈I(n,2,K−1){
X
[2]
i +X
[3]
i + S
[2,3]
i
}
i∈I(n,2,K)
...{
X
[K−1]
i +X
[K]
i + S
[K−1,K]
i
}
i∈I(n,2,(K2 ))
Layers 3 : K − 1
...
Layer K
{
X
[1]
i +X
[2]
i + · · ·+X
[K]
i + S
[1:K]
i
}
i∈I(n,K,1)
Table 1: The structure of the downloaded symbol from Server n.
lemma, the determinant polynomial evaluates to a nonzero value with probability approaching 1
as q increases. Averaging over all possible choices of U1, the probability of F1 ·U1[:, (1 : 4)] being
non-singular (hence we can decode correctly) tends to 1 as q increases.
Security and capacity-achieving are easy to verify. The proof is thus complete.
4.6 General parameters K,N, T, E
In this section, we present a capacity-achieving scheme for general parameters of K,N, T and E
when E < T . We first introduce the structure of the retrieval scheme and then discuss the detailed
precoding of the downloaded symbols.
4.6.1 Structure of the retrieval scheme
In our scheme, we force symmetry across the servers, i.e., the structure of the downloaded symbols
from all servers is the same. Table 1 shows the detailed structure for Server n and the structure is
explained in detail as follows.
The downloaded symbols from Server n may be divided into K layers. For layer ι ∈ [1 : K], each
symbol is a mixture of symbols from ι distinct messages (hence called an ι-sum) and a distinct
noise symbol. In particular, X
[k]
i denotes a mixture of symbols from message Wk (corresponding
to ai for a mixture of symbols from W1 in the examples), and S
[K]
i denotes a noise symbol added
to an ι-sum with type K ⊂ [1 : K] (where the type K is the set of message indices in the ι-sum).
Each layer ι includes all
(
K
ι
)
different types, and for each type, a same number of ι-sums are
downloaded. The types are ordered lexicographically and assigned a type index t (see Table 2).
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Type index Type of ι-sum Index set Downloaded symbols
1 {1, 2, . . . , ι− 2, ι− 1, ι} I(n, ι, 1)
{
X
[1]
i +X
[2]
i + · · ·+X
[ι]
i + S
[1:ι]
i
}
i∈I(n,ι,1)
2 {1, 2, . . . , ι− 2, ι− 1, ι+ 1} I(n, ι, 2)
{
X
[1]
i + · · · +X
[ι−1]
i +X
[ι+1]
i + S
[1,2,...,ι−1,ι+1]
i
}
i∈I(n,ι,2)
...
...
...
...
t {t1, t2, . . . , tι} I(n, ι, t)
{
X
[t1]
i +X
[t2]
i + · · ·+X
[tι]
i + S
[t1,t2,...,tι]
i
}
i∈I(n,ι,t)
...
...
...
...(
K
ι
)
{K − ι+ 1,K − ι+ 2, . . . ,K} I(n, ι,
(
K
ι
)
)
{
X
[K−ι+1]
i +X
[K−ι+2]
i + · · ·+X
[K]
i + S
[K−ι+1:K]
i
}
i∈I(n,ι,(Kι ))
Table 2: The structure of layer ι from Server n. |I(n, ι, t)| = (N − T )ι−1(T − E)K−ι.
For each type {t1, t2, . . . , tι} ⊂ [1 : K] with type index t, the user downloads |I(n, ι, t)| ι-sums
{X
[t1]
i +X
[t2]
i + · · · +X
[tι]
i + S
[t1,t2,...,tι]
i }, where i ∈ I(n, ι, t),
|I(n, ι, t)| , Iι = (N − T )
ι−1(T − E)K−ι, (46)
and I(n, ι, t) denotes the index set of the ι-sums. All the indices are formulated by
{I(n, ι, t)}
n=[1:N ],ι=[1:K],t=[1:(Kι )]
= [1 : NLn], (47)
where Ln is calculated below in (49) and NLn is the total number of mixtures of any message
appeared in all N servers. The indices are enumerated from 1 to NLn, and are distributed from
Server 1 to Server N , and at each server from layer 1 to layer K. (The same indices assignment
rule is used in the examples.)
We calculate the rate achieved. The number of symbols downloaded from each server is
Dn =
K∑
ι=1
(
K
ι
)
· Iι =
K∑
ι=1
(
K
ι
)
· (N − T )ι−1(T − E)K−ι =
(N −E)K − (T − E)K
N − T
. (48)
For any messageWk, the number of mixturesX
[k]
i of symbols fromWk involved in the downloads
from each server is
Ln =
K∑
ι=1
(
K − 1
ι− 1
)
· Iι =
K∑
ι=1
(
K − 1
ι− 1
)
· (N − T )ι−1(T − E)K−ι = (N − E)K−1. (49)
In Section 4.6.2 below, we will show that with proper precoding design of the mixtures {X
[k]
i }
and the noise symbols {S
[K]
i }, the scheme can decode (N − E) · Ln = (N −E)
K symbols from the
desired message. Hence, the scheme achieves the rate
R =
(N − E) · Ln
N ·Dn
=
(
1−
E
N
)
·
(N − E)K−1
(N−E)K−(T−E)K
N−T
=
(
1−
E
N
)
·
1− T−E
N−E
1−
(
T−E
N−E
)K . (50)
In the following, we present the details of the precoding design and the justification of security,
privacy, and correctness.
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4.6.2 Precoding design
Suppose each message consists of L = (N − E)K symbols from a sufficiently large field Fq. If
T > N − E, for ease of presentation, we add (T + E − N)(N − E)K−1 dummy variables to each
message to extend the message length to T (N − E)K−1. We abuse the notation by letting Wk
denote the extended message. Define Neff = max(N − E,T ) and L
′ = Ln ·Neff.
Precoding of the noise symbols: From Table 1 in Section 4.6.1, the scheme downloads Dn
symbols from each server and each symbol is added with a noise symbol. The noise symbols from
each query row are precoded by an (N,E)-MDS matrix CS. Then the corresponding systematic
parity check matrix is denoted by HS. From the dimension of the MDS code, we know that in
total, E ·Dn independent noise symbols are used, matching the minimum required size for common
randomness. The MDS property of the noise precoding matrix translates to E-security.
Precoding of the desired symbols: Suppose the user wants to retrieve Wl. The user
privately chooses K matrices U1,U2, . . . ,UK independently and uniformly from GLL′(Fq). Let
G
NLn×NeffLn
l be the precoding matrix of all X
[l]
i symbols from Wl. Thus, all N · Ln mixtures of
symbols from Wl in the retrieval scheme are generated by
{X
[l]
i }i∈I([1:N ],:,:) = G
NLn×NeffLn
l ·UlWl, (51)
and then {X
[l]
i }i∈I([1:N ],:,:) are distributed evenly to each query row. To guarantee T -privacy, we
require every T servers observe linearly independent random mixtures of symbols from Wl. That
is
Privacy condition 1 (for desired symbols): The
(
N
T
)
submatrices of G
NLn×NeffLn
l ,
each of which is comprised of TLn rows corresponding to a set of T servers, are non-
singular.
From all the received symbols, the user cancels the noise by projecting the N symbols in each
query row to the dual space of CS (i.e., multiplying with HS). The user further cancels the
interference of undesired symbols (to be justified in the following). The coefficients of UlWl are
given by Fl =
(
H
(N−E)×N
S ⊗ I
Ln
)
·G
NLn×NeffLn
l . Therefore, we have the following condition for
the correct decoding of Wl,
Correctness condition 1 (for desired symbols): The L×L square matrix Fl ·Ul[:
, (1 : L)] =
(
H
(N−E)×N
S ⊗ I
Ln
)
·G
NLn×NeffLn
l ·Ul[:, (1 : L)] is non-singular.
In the following, we show explicit precoding design for the case T ≤ N − E, and a random
choice will work almost surely T > N − E.
Case 1 (Explicit precoding design when T ≤ N −E): In this case, Neff = N −E. Let the
precoding matrix CS of the noise symbols be the Vandermonde matrix V
N (λ1, . . . , λE). Further,
let each query row be precoded by the same matrix G
N×(N−E)
l , where Gl is the Vandermonde
matrix VN (φ1, . . . , φN−E). The precoding matrix in (51) is G
NLn×NeffLn
l = G
N×(N−E)
l ⊗ I
Ln .
Then {X
[l]
i } are independent across different query rows. Further, every T rows of Gl are linearly
independent. Therefore, every T servers observe linearly independent random mixtures of symbols
from Wl, and privacy condition 1 is satisfied.
In this case, L′ = L, andUl[:, (1 : L)] = Ul is non-singular. Note that Fl =
(
H
(N−E)×N
S ⊗ I
Ln
)
·(
G
N×(N−E)
l ⊗ I
Ln
)
= (HS · Gl) ⊗ I
Ln , so correctness condition 1 translates to the requirement
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of HS ·Gl being non-singular. This ensures that for any realization of Ul, the user obtains N −
E linearly independent combinations in desired symbols from each query row. We require that
{λ1, . . . , λE , φ1, . . . , φN−E} are distinct nonzero elements from Fq such that the columns of CS and
Gl are linearly independent. Note that the parity check matrix HS projects any vector that is in
the span of the columns of CS to zero. As the columns of CS and Gl are linearly independent, we
know that HS ·Gl is non-singular, and correctness condition 1 is satisfied.
Case 2 (Random choices work almost surely when T > N − E): In this case, Neff = T .
Let each entry of G
NLn×TLn
l be chosen independently and uniformly over Fq. We show that as
q →∞, the probability that Gl satisfies correctness condition 1 approaches 1.
The proof relies on the Schwartz Zippel lemma [12, 13] about the roots of polynomials, where
the variables of the polynomials to be considered are the entries of Gl.
Privacy condition 1 requires that
(
N
T
)
submatrices of Gl corresponding to
(
N
T
)
possible sets
of T -colluding servers are non-singular. It is evident that the determinant polynomial of each
submatrix is not the zero polynomial. Therefore, as the field size q increases, the probability
that each determinant polynomial evaluates to a nonzero value (the submatrix being non-singular)
approaches 1. It follows that all
(
N
T
)
submatrices are non-singular with probability approaching 1
as q increases. As a uniform choice of Gl works almost surely, there are infinite many choices of
feasible Gl. The final choice of Gl will be uniformly chosen from this feasible set.
To check correctness condition 1, consider an arbitrary realization of Ul. As Ul is a full-rank
matrix, there exist L linearly independent rows in Ul[; , (1 : L)], the indices of which are denoted by
LUl . We argue that the determinant polynomial of Fl ·Ul[:, (1 : L)] =
(
HS ⊗ I
Ln
)
·Gl ·Ul[:, (1 : L)]
is not the zero polynomial, because one can set the L columns of Gl with indices LUl to be
independent of the null space of HS (similar choice as in Case 1 suffices), and other columns
to be zeros, such that Fl · Ul[:, (1 : L)] is non-singular. Therefore, by Schwartz Zippel lemma,
the determinant polynomial of Fl · Ul[:, (1 : L)] evaluates to a nonzero value with probability
approaching 1 as the field size q increases. Averaging over all possible choice of Ul, the probability
of Fl ·Ul[:, (1 : L)] being non-singular (hence we can decode correctly) tends to 1 as q increases.
Precoding of undesired symbols: We now consider the precoding for the undesired mes-
sages, Wk, k 6= l. We wish to ensure that the undesired symbols that appear in an ι-sum (thus from
layer ι ∈ [1 : K − 1]) with a type that does not contain the desired message Wl are sufficient to
reconstruct the undesired symbols that appear in an ι+ 1-sum (thus from layer ι+ 1) with a type
that contains the desired message Wl. If this is satisfied, then all interferences can be cancelled.
Next, we proceed to consider the precoding of these undesired symbols in the pure undesired ι-sums
and the ι+1-sums that contain Wl. The design for different ι is done separately and from ι = 1 to
ι = K − 1. Consider an arbitrary fixed ι. Further, the design for different types of the undesired
ι-sum is done separately and in increasing order of the type index. Consider an arbitrary undesired
type K = {k1, . . . , kι} where l /∈ K. Assume the lexicographic index of the type K among all types
with cardinality ι (i.e., in layer ι) is t, and the lexicographic index of type K∪ l in layer ι+ 1 is t′.
To simplify the notation, X
[k1]
i + · · · +X
[kι]
i is denoted as X
[K]
i . Therefore, we are considering the
design of the following symbols.
Server 1 . . . Server N
Layer ι:
{
X
[K]
i + S
[K]
i
}
i∈I(1,ι,t)
. . .
{
X
[K]
i + S
[K]
i
}
i∈I(N,ι,t)
Layer ι+ 1:
{
X
[l]
i +X
[K]
i + S
[K,l]
i
}
i∈I(1,ι+1,t′)
. . .
{
X
[l]
i +X
[K]
i + S
[K,l]
i
}
i∈I(N,ι+1,t′)
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Recall that |I(n, ι, t)| = Iι = (N−T )
ι−1(T−E)K−ι, |I(n, ι, t′)| = Iι+1 = (N−T )
ι(T−E)K−ι−1,
and U1,U2, . . . ,UK are uniform L
′ × L′ full-rank matrices, where L′ = Neff · (N − E)
K−1. Let
GK,ι denote an N(Iι + Iι+1) × T (Iι + Iι+1) precoding matrix. The symbols {X
[K]
i } in the above
table are generated by,
{X
[K]
i }i∈I([1:N ],[ι:ι+1],{t,t′}) = GK,ι ·
∑
k∈K
Uk[Jk, :]Wk, (52)
where Jk is a vector with T (Iι + Iι+1) distinct elements in [1 : L
′] that have not been used (by
default, the rows of Uk are used from the first to the last). Then {X
[K]
i } are distributed evenly
to the servers. Note that the precoding matrix GK,ι does not depend on the message index or the
type index. In other words, the same precoding matrix is used for all undesired messages and all
types. This is important to align the interference so that the interfering sum could be cancelled
without knowing the individual terms in the sum.
The dimension of GK,ι is chosen to ensure T -privacy, which requires that each T servers observe
linearly independent random combinations of symbols from Wk. This translates to the following
condition,
Privacy condition 2 (for undesired symbols): The
(
N
T
)
submatrices of GK,ι, each
of which is comprised of T distinct block rows, are non-singular.
Note that GK,ι can be viewed as a block matrix consisting of NT square submatrices of dimension
(Iι + Iι+1) and G
Iι+Iι+1
K,ι [i, :] is a block row that is comprised of a row of square submatrices.
After multiplying the symbols in the above table with HS =
[
(−P)(N−E)×E |IN−E
]
to cancel
the noise, we have the precoding matrix of Uk[Jk, :]Wk as
FK,ι =
(
HS ⊗ I
Iι+Iι+1
)
·GK,ι (53)
=


G
Iι+Iι+1
K,ι [E + 1, :]−P[1, :] ·G
Iι+Iι+1
K,ι [(1 : E), :]
...
G
Iι+Iι+1
K,ι [N, :]−P[N − E, :] ·G
Iι+Iι+1
K,ι [(1 : E), :]

 . (54)
To guarantee correct decoding of the desired message symbols, we require that FK,ι has de-
pendent rows in a way such that the interference of Wk can be cancelled. Specifically, after noise
cancellation, there are (N − E)Iι {X
[K]
i } symbols in layer ι and we wish to ensure that they can
reconstruct the (N − E)Iι+1 {X
[K]
i } symbols (mixed with {X
[l]
i }) in layer ι + 1. To this end, we
require that the {X
[K]
i } symbols in layer ι and layer ι+ 1 form an MDS code. Therefore, we have
the following (sufficient but not necessary) condition on correctness decoding,
Correctness condition 2 (for undesired symbols): There exists an MDS matrix
Minterference of dimension (N − E)(Iι + Iι+1)× (T − E)(Iι + Iι+1), such that
FK,ι = MinterferenceF
Iι+Iι+1
K,ι [(1 : T − E), :]. (55)
Note that (N − E) · Iι = (T − E) · (Iι + Iι+1).
In the following, we expand Minterference and (55) to represent GK,ι by Minterference, such that
the privacy condition 2 can also be translated into a condition on Minterference.
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Let {Mi,j}i∈[1:N−T ],j∈[1:T−E] be (N − T )(T − E) square matrices of dimension Iι + Iι+1, and
Minterference be a systematic MDS matrix such that
Minterference =


I
(T−E)(Iι+Iι+1)
M1,1 . . . M1,T−E
...
...
...
MN−T,1 . . . MN−T,T−E

 . (56)
Then (55) is equivalent to

G
Iι+Iι+1
K,ι [T + 1, :] −P[T −E + 1, :] ·G
Iι+Iι+1
K,ι [(1 : E), :]
...
G
Iι+Iι+1
K,ι [N, :]−P[N − E, :] ·G
Iι+Iι+1
K,ι [(1 : E), :]

 = (57)

 M1,1 . . . M1,T−E... ... ...
MN−T,1 . . . MN−T,T−E

 ·


G
Iι+Iι+1
K,ι [E + 1, :]−P[1, :] ·G
Iι+Iι+1
K,ι [(1 : E), :]
...
G
Iι+Iι+1
K,ι [T, :]−P[T − E, :] ·G
Iι+Iι+1
K,ι [(1 : E), :].

 . (58)
This imposes the structure of GK,ι to be
GK,ι =


I
T (Iι+Iι+1)
N1,1 . . . N1,E M1,1 . . . M1,T−E
...
...
NN−T,1 . . . NN−T,E MN−T,1 . . . MN−T,T−E


︸ ︷︷ ︸
, G˜K,ι
·G
Iι+Iι+1
K,ι [(1 : T ), :], (59)
where Ni,j = P[T −E+ i, j] ·I
Iι+Iι+1−
∑T−E
t=1 P[t, j] ·Mi,t. We set G
Iι+Iι+1
K,ι [(1 : T ), :] as the identity
matrix such that GK,ι = G˜K,ι.
Therefore, the privacy condition 2 is equivalent to
Privacy condition 2’ (for undesired symbols): There exist (N−T )(T −E) square
matrices {Mi,j}i∈[1:N−T ],j∈[1:T−E] of dimension Iι + Iι+1, such that
(
N
T
)
submatrices of
G˜K,ι, each of which is comprised of distinct T block rows, are non-singular.
Now correctness condition 2 and privacy condition 2’ are both stated in terms of Mi,j. We next
proceed to show the existence of Mi,j such that both conditions are satisfied. To this end, we will
pick each entry of Mi,j independently and uniformly from a sufficiently large field.
First, consider correctness condition 2, which requires Minterference to be MDS. From (56), it
is easy to see that over a sufficiently large finite field, by randomly choosing Mi,j, Minterference is
MDS with high probability.
Second, consider privacy condition 2’, which requires the submatrices of G˜K,ι (made up of T
block rows) to be non-singular. For these submatrices, we have three cases.
• Case 1: The submatrix consists of the first T block rows, which is an identity matrix and
therefore is non-singular directly.
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• Case 2: The submatrix consists of t block rows from the first T block rows, and T − t block
rows from the remaining N − T block rows. We show that by elementary row and column
operations and a proper choice of a realization of Mi,j , the matrix is non-singular.
First consider the first t block rows. Each one of the first t block rows contains one identity
matrix, and by exchanging columns, we have the identity matrix on the upper left corner and
then the upper right corner is a zero matrix (see (61)). It remains to show that the lower
right corner (denoted by MT−t in (60)) is non-singular.
The last T − t block rows depend on the {Mi,j} matrices. Here we have 3 cases: 1) M
T−t
contains only {Mi,j} matrices, 2) M
T−t contains both {Mi,j} and {Ni,j} matrices, and 3)
MT−t contains only {Ni,j} matrices. In the following, we prove the non-singularity of M
T−t
for all 3 cases.


I 0 0
0
. . . 0 0
t×(T−t)
0 0 I
· · · · · · · · · M
T−t

 (60)
Case 2.1: MT−t consists of only {Mi,j} matrices (this may happen when t ≥ E) with distinct
(i, j) indices and therefore is non-singular by setting it to identity.
Case 2.2: MT−t consists of T − t− j block columns of {Mi,j} matrices and j block columns
of {Ni,j} matrices, where max(E− t, 0) ≤ j ≤ E. We rearrange {Mi,j} matrices to the left so
that MT−t is in the form of (61). Note that this operation does not change the upper right
zero matrix in (60). It is easy to see that the upper left part in (61) is non-singular. The
lower left part (which contains Mi,j matrices) is set to the zero matrix. The lower right part
is the Kronecker product of a square submatrix of P (of dimension j ≤ E) and the identity
matrix (note that the {Mi,j} matrices in these {Ni,j} matrices in the lower right part are set
to 0 so that we are left with only Pj). Remember that P is MDS, so every square submatrix
of P is non-singular. Then, Pj ⊗ I is also non-singular and MT−t has full rank.
MT−t =


Mi1,1 · · · Mi1,T−t−j
...
. . .
...
...
MiT−t−j ,1 · · · MiT−t−j ,T−t−j
0
j×(T−t−j)
Pj ⊗ I

 (61)
Case 2.3: MT−t consists of only {Ni,j} matrices (this may happen when t ≥ T − E) with
distinct (i, j) indices. In this case, we set all the {Mi,j} matrices which appear in {Ni,j}
matrices to be zero matrices. Then
MT−t = PT−t ⊗ I, (62)
where T − t ≤ E. Similar to the arguments in Case 2.2, PT−t is non-singular and so is MT−t.
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• Case 3: The submatrix consists of T block rows from the last N − T blocks rows of G˜K,ι.
This case corresponds to Case 2.2 when t = 0, and the submatrix is the same as that in (61)
with t = 0 and j = E. In this case, we must have T ≤ N − T such that N ≥ 2T > 2E, and
N − E > E. Then the E × E submatrix PE of P is non-singular and so is the submatrix.
The analysis above shows that the determinant polynomials of the required submatrices of G˜K,ι
are nonzero. Then, by the Schwartz Zippel lemma [12, 13], a uniform random choice of Mi,j from
a sufficiently large field will ensure that with high probability, the determinants of the submatrices
are nonzero. Therefore, the submatrices are non-singular and note that this holds for undesired
symbols with all types and all layers. Further, for the symbols designed for each type and each
two layers, disjoint row vectors from Uk are multiplied with GK,ι and in total TLn vectors from
Uk are used. Then by Lemma 1 in [2], the precoding coefficients for Wk, k ∈ [1 : K] are identically
distributed as Uk[(1 : TLn); :]. As Uk are identically distributed for all k, the message indices are
equally likely and can not be distinguished. In other words, any T servers see linearly independent
uniformly random combinations of both the desired message and undesired messages, and T -privacy
is guaranteed.
To sum up, we have completed the description of the precoding of noise, desired and undesired
symbols, and have proved that the scheme is secure, correct, private and the rate achieved is equal
to the capacity. The achievability proof is thus complete.
5 Achievability when E ≥ T
Proving achievability in this case is relatively straightforward and follows from that in [11]. We
present the proof here for completeness.
Suppose each message is comprised of N − E symbols from Fq with q > E. Let W(1:K) =
(W
[1]
1 , . . . ,W
[1]
N−E , . . . ,W
[K]
1 , . . . ,W
[K]
N−E) represent the symbols of all K messages. The user wants
to retrieve Wk = (W
[k]
1 , . . . ,W
[k]
N−E) privately from the servers.
The queries are generated in the following way. The user firstly generates E independent
uniformly random vectors U1, . . . , UE of length K(N −E), and then chooses an (N,E)-GRS (gen-
eralized Reed-Solomon) code with generating matrix G(N,E). Let Λ = (λ1, . . . , λN ) ∈ F
N
q where
λi 6= λj . Let Φ = (φ1, . . . , φN ) ∈ F
N
q where φi 6= 0. The generating matrix G(N,E) is defined by
G(N,E) = V
E(λ1, . . . , λN ) · diag(Φ). (63)
Let e
[k]
i denote the length-(K(N −E)) unit vector where only the
(
(k− 1)(N −E)+ i
)
-th entry
is 1 and all the other entries are equal to 0. The purpose of e
[k]
i is to retrieve the i-th entry of Wk.
The query vectors are generated by
[Q
[k]
1 , . . . , Q
[k]
N ] = [U1, . . . , UE ] ·G(N,E) + [0, . . . , 0, e
[k]
1 , . . . , e
[k]
N−E ]. (64)
The nodes share E common randomness symbols (S1, . . . , SE) = S(1:E) that are uniformly and
independently chosen from Fq. The servers generate their answers by taking the inner product
of the query vector and the stored data vector, then adding a linear combination of the common
randomness,
A[k]n = 〈Q
[k]
n ,W(1:K)〉+ 〈G(N,E)[:, n], S(1:E)〉. (65)
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Let Xj = 〈Uj ,W(1:K)〉+ Sj, j ∈ [1 : E], the answers received by the user can be presented by
[A
[k]
1 , . . . , A
[k]
N ] = [X1, . . . ,XE ,W
[k]
1 , . . . ,W
[k]
N−E ] ·
[
G(N,E)
0 I
]
, (66)
where the dimensions of 0 and I are clear from the context.
Correctness: From (63),
[
G(N,E)
0 I
]
is invertible such that the user can obtain Wk.
T -privacy: The T -privacy constraint is guaranteed, because from (64), every E query vectors are
independently and uniformly distributed. Note that E ≥ T , so every T nodes can not tell which
message the user requests. Note also that E-privacy is obtained for free.
E-security: Guaranteed by the MDS property of the GRS code, i.e., any E columns of G(N,E)
are linearly independent.
Remark 1 Besides the desired message, the user could further obtain [X1, . . . ,XE ] from (66).
Theses E symbols are protected by independent noise symbols S(1:E). Therefore, the user learns
no extra information beyond the desired message, i.e., symmetric PIR constraint is satisfied at no
additional cost.
6 Converse when E < T
Let us start with a few lemmas. The lemma below shows that the answers of a set of servers do
not depend on the queries when other messages are desired or the queries to other servers, after
conditioning on their own queries.
Lemma 1 For any set of nodes N ⊂ [1 : N ], and any set of message index K ⊂ [1 : K],
H(A
[k]
N |Q,WK, Q
[k]
N ) = H(A
[k]
N |WK, Q
[k]
N ); (67)
H(A
[k]
N |WK, Q
[k]
[1:N ]) = H(A
[k]
N |WK, Q
[k]
N ). (68)
Proof: As I(A
[k]
N ;Q|WK, Q
[k]
N ) ≥ 0 holds trivially, we only need to show I(A
[k]
N ;Q|WK, Q
[k]
N ) ≤ 0.
The proof is presented next.
I(A
[k]
N ;Q|WK, Q
[k]
N ) ≤ I(A
[k]
N ,W[1:K], S;Q|WK, Q
[k]
N ) (69)
= I(W[1:K], S;Q|WK, Q
[k]
N ) + I(A
[k]
N ;Q|W[1:K], S,WK, Q
[k]
N ) (70)
(a)
= I(W[1:K], S;Q|WK, Q
[k]
N ) (71)
= H(W[1:K], S|WK, Q
[k]
N )−H(W[1:K], S|WK,Q) (72)
(b)
≤ H(W[1:K]\K, S)−H(W[1:K]\K, S|Q) (73)
= I(W[1:K]\K, S;Q) (74)
(c)
= 0, (75)
where (a) holds because the answers are deterministic functions of the messages, common random-
ness, and queries. (b) and (c) follow from the independence of the messages, queries and common
randomness (refer to (6)(7)).
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Note that we allow K to be the empty set. (68) follows from (67) and is the form that will be
used in the remaining proofs. 
The following lemma allows us to split the answers from all N servers into two parts, one from
E servers and the other from the remaining N − E servers.
Lemma 2 For any node set E ⊂ [1 : N ] and |E| = E,(
1−
E
N
)
H(A
[1]
[1:N ]|Q
[1]
[1:N ]) ≥ L− o(L) +H(A
[1]
[1:N ]\E |W1, A
[1]
E , Q
[1]
[1:N ]). (76)
Proof: From the correctness constraint, H(W1|A
[1]
[1:N ], Q
[1]
[1:N ]) = o(L), we have
H(A
[1]
[1:N ]|Q
[1]
[1:N ]) (77)
= H(W1|Q
[1]
[1:N ]) +H(A
[1]
[1:N ]|W1, Q
[1]
[1:N ])−H(W1|A
[1]
[1:N ], Q
[1]
[1:N ]) (78)
= L+H(A
[1]
[1:N ]|W1, Q
[1]
[1:N ])− o(L) (79)
= L− o(L) +H(A
[1]
E |W1, Q
[1]
[1:N ]) +H(A
[1]
[1:N ]\E |W1, A
[1]
E , Q
[1]
[1:N ]) (80)
(a)
= L− o(L) +H(A
[1]
E |Q
[1]
[1:N ]) +H(A
[1]
[1:N ]\E |W1, A
[1]
E , Q
[1]
[1:N ]) (81)
(b)
≥ L− o(L) +
E
N
H(A
[1]
[1:N ]|Q
[1]
[1:N ]) +H(A
[1]
[1:N ]\E |W1, A
[1]
E , Q
[1]
[1:N ]), (82)
where in (a), E can be any node set with size E. (b) follows by averaging over all E ∈ [1 : N ] with
size E, and applying Han’s inequality [14]. 
For the answers from N − E servers, we have the following recursive relationship.
Lemma 3 For any k ∈ [1 : K − 1], and for any node set E ⊂ [1 : N ] and |E| = E,
H(A
[k]
[1:N ]\E |W[1:k], A
[k]
E , Q
[k]
[1:N ]) ≥
T − E
N −E
(
H(A
[k+1]
[1:N ]\E |W[1:k+1], A
[k+1]
E , Q
[k+1]
[1:N ] ) + L− o(L)
)
. (83)
Proof: For any set T ′ ∈ [1 : N ] \ E with size |T ′| = T − E,
H(A
[k]
[1:N ]\E |W[1:k], A
[k]
E , Q
[k]
[1:N ]) ≥ H(A
[k]
T ′ |W[1:k], A
[k]
E , Q
[k]
[1:N ]) (84)
(a)
= H(A
[k]
T ′ |W[1:k], A
[k]
E , Q
[k]
T ′∪E) (85)
(b)
= H(A
[k+1]
T ′ |W[1:k], A
[k+1]
E , Q
[k+1]
T ′∪E) (86)
(c)
= H(A
[k+1]
T ′ |W[1:k], A
[k+1]
E , Q
[k+1]
[1:N ] ), (87)
where (a) and (c) follow from Lemma 1, and (b) is due to the privacy constraint (11).
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Averaging over all T ′ ∈ [1 : N ] \ E with size T − E and using Han’s inequality [14], we have
H(A
[k]
[1:N ]\E |W[1:k], A
[k]
E , Q
[k]
[1:N ]) (88)
≥
1(
N−E
T−E
) ∑
T ′⊂[1:N ]\E
|T ′|=T−E
H(A
[k+1]
T ′ |W[1:k], A
[k+1]
E , Q
[k+1]
[1:N ] ) (89)
≥
T − E
N − E
·H(A
[k+1]
[1:N ]\E |W[1:k], A
[k+1]
E , Q
[k+1]
[1:N ] ) (90)
=
T − E
N − E
·
(
H(A
[k+1]
[1:N ]\E |W[1:k+1], A
[k+1]
E , Q
[k+1]
[1:N ] ) +H(Wk+1|W[1:k], A
[k+1]
E , Q
[k+1]
[1:N ] ) (91)
−H(Wk+1|W[1:k], A
[k+1]
[1:N ] , Q
[k+1]
[1:N ] )
)
(92)
(a)
=
T − E
N − E
·
(
H(A
[k+1]
[1:N ]\E |W[1:k+1], A
[k+1]
E , Q
[k+1]
[1:N ] ) + L− o(L). (93)
In (a), the second term follows from the security constraint (10) and the independence of the
messages, and the third term follows from the correctness constraint (12).

6.1 The proof of R ≤
(
1− E
N
) (
1 +
T−E
N−E
+ · · ·+
(
T−E
N−E
)K−1)−1
Applying Lemma 3 iteratively, we have
H(A
[1]
[1:N ]\E |W1, A
[1]
E , Q
[1]
[1:N ]) (94)
≥
T − E
N − E
(
H(A
[2]
[1:N ]\E |W1,W2, A
[2]
E , Q
[2]
[1:N ]) + L− o(L)
)
(95)
≥ (L− o(L))
(
T − E
N − E
+
(
T − E
N − E
)2)
+
(
T −E
N − E
)2
H(A
[3]
[1:N ]\E |W[1:3], A
[3]
E , Q
[3]
[1:N ]) (96)
≥ (L− o(L))
(
T − E
N − E
+ · · · +
(
T − E
N − E
)K−1)
+
(
T − E
N − E
)K−1
H(A
[K]
[1:N ]\E |W[1:K], A
[K]
E , Q
[K]
[1:N ])
(97)
≥ (L− o(L))
(
T − E
N − E
+ · · · +
(
T − E
N − E
)K−1)
. (98)
Combining with Lemma 2, we have(
1−
E
N
)
H(A
[1]
[1:N ]|Q
[1]
[1:N ]) ≥ (L− o(L))
(
1 +
T − E
N − E
+ · · ·+
(
T − E
N − E
)K−1)
. (99)
From the definition of the PIR rate and by letting L→∞,
R =
H(W1)∑N
n=1H(A
[1]
n |Q
[1]
n )
≤
L
H(A
[1]
[1:N ]|Q
[1]
[1:N ])
(100)
≤
(
1−
E
N
)(
1 +
T − E
N − E
+ · · · +
(
T − E
N − E
)K−1)−1
. (101)
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6.2 The proof of ρ ≥ E
N−E
(
1 +
T−E
N−E + · · ·+
(
T−E
N−E
)K−1)
For any set of nodes E ⊂ [1 : N ] with size |E| = E, from the security constraint (10),
0 = I(W[1:K];A
[k]
E , Q
[k]
E ) (102)
= H(A
[k]
E |Q
[k]
E )−H(A
[k]
E |W[1:K], Q
[k]
E ) (103)
(a)
= H(A
[k]
E |Q
[k]
E )−H(A
[k]
E |W[1:K], Q
[k]
E ) +H(A
[k]
E |W[1:K], Q
[k]
E , S) (104)
= H(A
[k]
E |Q
[k]
E )− I(S;A
[k]
E |W[1:K], Q
[k]
E ) (105)
≥ H(A
[k]
E |Q
[k]
E )−H(S) (106)
(b)
= H(A
[k]
E |Q
[k]
[1:N ])−H(S). (107)
(a) holds because the answers are deterministic functions of the queries, messages, and common
randomness. By setting K = ∅ in Lemma 1, we have (b).
Averaging over all E ,
H(S) ≥
1(
N
E
) ∑
E∈[1:N ]
|E|=E
H(A
[k]
E |Q
[k]
[1:N ]) (108)
≥
E
N
·H(A
[k]
[1:N ]|Q
[k]
[1:N ]). (109)
From (99), we have H(A
[k]
[1:N ]
|Q
[k]
[1:N ]
) ≥ N
N−E
(
1 + T−E
N−E + · · ·+
(
T−E
N−E
)K−1)
(L−o(L)). Hence,
by letting L→∞, ρ = H(S)
H(Wk)
≥ E
N−E
(
1 + T−E
N−E + · · · +
(
T−E
N−E
)K−1)
.
7 Converse when E ≥ T
7.1 The proof of R ≤ 1− E
N
From the correctness constraint, for any message Wk, H(Wk|A
[k]
[1:N ], Q
[k]
[1:N ]) = o(L). For any set of
nodes E ⊂ [1 : N ] with size |E| = E,
H(Wk) = H(Wk|Q
[k]
[1:N ])−H(Wk|A
[k]
[1:N ], Q
[k]
[1:N ]) + o(L) (110)
= H(A
[k]
[1:N ]|Q
[k]
[1:N ])−H(A
[k]
[1:N ]|Wk, Q
[k]
[1:N ]) + o(L) (111)
≤ H(A
[k]
[1:N ]|Q
[k]
[1:N ])−H(A
[k]
E |Wk, Q
[k]
[1:N ]) + o(L) (112)
(a)
= H(A
[k]
[1:N ]|Q
[k]
[1:N ])−H(A
[k]
E |Wk, Q
[k]
E ) + o(L) (113)
(b)
= H(A
[k]
[1:N ]|Q
[k]
[1:N ])−H(A
[k]
E |Q
[k]
E ) + o(L) (114)
≤ H(A
[k]
[1:N ]|Q
[k]
[1:N ])−H(A
[k]
E |Q
[k]
[1:N ]) + o(L) (115)
≤ H(A
[k]
[1:N ]|Q
[k]
[1:N ])−
E
N
H(A
[k]
[1:N ]|Q
[k]
[1:N ]) + o(L), (116)
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where (a) follows from Lemma 1 and (b) follows from the security constraint (10). (116) follows by
averaging over all E with size E and from Han’s inequality.
Therefore, by letting L→∞, R = H(Wk)∑N
n=1H(A
[k]
n )
≤ H(Wk)
H(A
[k]
[1:N]
|Q)
≤ 1− E
N
.
7.2 The proof of ρ ≥ E
N−E
Note that (109) holds when E ≥ T as well. Then we have H(S) ≥ E
N
·H(A
[k]
[1:N ]|Q
[k]
[1:N ]). From (116),
we have H(A
[k]
[1:N ]|Q
[k]
[1:N ]) ≥
N
N−E (H(Wk)− o(L)). Hence, by letting L→∞, ρ =
H(S)
H(Wk)
≥ E
N−E .
8 Conclusions
We show that CETPIR =
(
1− E
N
)
·
(
1 + T−E
N−E +
(
T−E
N−E
)2
+ · · ·+
(
T−E
N−E
)K−1)−1
when E < T , and(
1− E
N
)
when E ≥ T . It is surprising that by adding eavesdroppers and allowing servers to collude
in the PIR problem, there is a synergistic effect and the problem behaves differently in two regimes.
In particular, when E ≥ T , the PIR problem behaves like SPIR. The ETPIR problem includes many
previous works as special cases (refer to Figure 1), and the present work capitalizes on all ideas
used in these works. Further, new challenges arise that go beyond previously studied problems, and
new ideas are proposed to resolve the corresponding challenges. In particular, in the achievability
proof when E < T (Section 4), we require a layered MDS structure that simultaneously handles 3
correlated constraints – security, privacy and correctness.
Regarding future work, it will be interesting to see whether including other elements would result
in similar synergistic interactions, such as coded databases [15, 16], non-responsive servers [2],
active adversaries [5, 11, 17], multi-round protocols [18], arbitrary message length [19, 20] and
secure storage [21, 22] etc. Another promising direction is to find explicit precoding matrices when
E < T as we have only shown the existence in our schemes. In particular, it is interesting to see
if Vandermonde matrices are sufficient. Also, our correctness conditions are over-constrained such
that relaxations might lead to field size reduction.
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